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Section 1: Introduction 
Many political analysts and observers suggest that Japan 
does not spend "enough" on National Defense (Schroeder, 1988; 
Sato, 1986). The U.S.-Japan military alliance enabled Japan to 
enjoy the fruits of world economic and political stability while 
spending very little to maintain the current world order. This 
potential "free-ride" provided Japan with the resources to grow 
at over 8 percent per annum between 1951 and 1971 and at an 
average annual rate of 4 percent thereafter. Since the Japanese 
government did not have to spend a portion of its budget on 
paying the salaries of military enlisted men and purchasing tanks 
and destroyers, the government could channel the large Japanese 
household savings into investment in promising industries such as 
automobiles and electronics. Also, since the world was 
relatively stable during Japan's rapid growth period, Japan could 
import primary commodities cheaply, and export finished 
manufactured products to a receptive international market. In 
short, these analysts imply that Japan after World War II was one 
of the principal beneficiaries of international political 
stability, a stability that came mostly at the expense of United 
States government spending. 
Japan's ratio of the defense budget to GNP has averaged 
just under one percent between 1977 and 1987, while that for 
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the United States has fluctuated between six and seven percent 
during the same period. The definition of the defense budget, 
however, differs in the two countries. 
This essay has three aims in evaluating Japan's military 
security burden. First, the composition of the defense budget of 
Japan will be reviewed, and an attempt will be made to make the 
definition of the Japanese defense budget consistent with the 
NATO definition of the defense budget. The NATO definition 
includes (1) All spending on regular military forces, (2) 
Military aid (including equipment and training) to other nations, 
(3) Military pensions, (4) Host government expenses for U.S. 
forces, and (5) Host country infrastructure and staff costs. The 
Japanese defense budget omits item (3), and items (4) and (5) are 
probably underestimated. The U.S. defense budget definition is 
roughly consistent with the NATO definition. In Section 2 of 
this essay, I show that even when the composition of the Japanese 
defense budget is made comparable to the NATO definition of the 
budget, the Japanese defense budget as a proportion of its GNP in 
1985 will rise to just under two percent. 
Second, the essay seeks to provide a rough measure for the 
level of defense expenditures "appropriate" to the level of 
benefits that Japan receives from international security and 
maintenance of the current world order. 
The analysis of Japan's security needs has traditionally 
focused on defining the direct external threats that Japan faces 
and calculating the likely level of U.S. military aid, given the 
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prevailing relationship between the two countries. The 
difference between the defense needed to neutralize the direct 
external threat and the military aid the U.S. is likely to 
provide is the level of defense required for Japan. The required 
level would typically be phrased in the form of the number of 
minesweepers, submarines, anti-submarines, interceptors, ground-
to-air missiles, troops, etc. The optimal mix of military 
hardware and software will depend on the type and extent of the 
external threat (whether the threat is from air, land, or sea) 
and on the type of military aid the U.S. is likely to provide. 
Corresponding to whatever the appropriate optimal mix of military 
hardware and software would be a yen or dollar amount needed to 
finance the defense expenditures. As an example of this 
traditional analysis of security requirements, Japan in 1976 
adopted the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) stipulating 
that the country should possess a peacetime force large enough to 
repel a "limited and small-scale aggression." The assumption 
underlying the NDPO is that Japan should be able to deter a 
Recently, the notion of "Comprehensive Security" (Sogo 
Anzenhosho) has been proposed in a number of Japanese government 
task forces (Akaha, 1987). According to these task forces, threats 
to a nation are not only of a military nature, but also may relate 
to a country's food or energy supply. Hence, Japanese security 
policy should not be merely regional in East Asia, but should also 
include pursuing political stability in th& food and natural 
resource producing nations in Southeast Asia and oil producing 
countries in the Middle East. 
The "Comprehensive Security" concept, however, still does not 
recognize the necessity of maintaining the entire current global 
order so that Japan's export market and foreign investments are 
protected. 
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limited attack by the Soviet Union until the United States would 
come to Japan's rescue (Mochizuki, 1984). To achieve the NDPO 
objective, the "prevailing" Japanese Self-Defense Forces had to 
be augmented with a brigade in Shikoku, an armored division in 
Hokkaido, two helicopters, ten helicopters to equip a helicopter 
destroyer, and an airborne early warning unit. The sum of the 
total cost of these improvements and the defense commitments 
already prevailing was calculated to be about one percent of 
Japan's 1976 Gross National Product. 
An assumption of this essay is that such traditional 
calculations based on Japan's regional needs are too limited in 
scope. Japan not only trades with Pacific Basin nations, but 
also conducts significant commerce with the Middle East and 
Europe. In 1986, Japanese exports to the European Common Market 
were 15 percent of its total exports. Japan's imports from the 
OPEC nations were 18 percent of its total imports. U.S. efforts 
to provide stability in the Persian Gulf benefit Japanese oil 
importers and the Japanese petro-chemical industry. Peace and 
economic prosperity in Europe benefit Japanese exporters of 
manufactured goods. And of course U.S. economic growth enhances 
the profitability of a wide range of Japanese industries, both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing. Given that Japanese 
interests are global, and not merely regional in East Asia, Japan 
should be more concerned with the maintenance of the current 
world order rather than with securing peace and stability only in 
its immediate environment. An increase in world instability 
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hurts Japan, especially since Japan has traditionally refrained 
from exporting weapons. Japanese exporters of manufactured goods 
will face diminished foreign markets. The price of primary 
commodities, especially crude oil, will rise. Japanese owners of 
overseas financial assets will incur heavy capital losses due to 
the increased political risk of asset seizure by foreign 
governments. 
Under the assumption that world peace improves a given 
country's GNP, Section 3 shows that the ratio of a country's 
defense spending to the country's GNP that is consistent with the 
benefits a country receives from peace is an increasing function 
of the country's potential output. A country's potential output 
is the GNP a nation is capable of producing, given the full 
employment of its physical capital and labor. Assuming that both 
the United States and West Germany are currently spending 
defense-GNP ratios "consistent" with what they derive from world 
political stability, and assuming Japan's potential output 
is between those of the United States and West Germany, Japan is 
deriving benefits from world security that is consistent with its 
spending between 4.0 and 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense—4.0 
and 6.5 percent are the defense spending-GNP ratios for West 
Germany and the United States. 
It should be stressed that in no way does this essay 
recommend that Japan spend between 4.0 and 6.5 percent of its GNP 
on defense. The optimal amount of defense spending for Japan 
depends chiefly on its relationship with the United States, and 
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on the relationship of the U.S. with NATO, the Soviet Union, and 
the non-aligned countries. If the U.S. can always be trusted to 
come to the complete and perfect rescue of Japan against any 
aggressor, the optimal amount of defense expenditures for Japan 
is zero.2 By the level of defense spending "consistent" with 
benefits, I mean the hypothetical level of taxation that a 
supranational power will charge each nation according to the 
benefits from world security that each nation receives. There is 
no implication that this level of taxation is some "just" or 
"fair" level. To make an assessment of fairness, we must make an 
assumption of what distribution of national income among allied 
nations is desirable, but such an assumption will always be 
arbitrary. 
It should also be pointed out that the simple model of 
Section 3 assumes that international security increases with 
the level of defense expenditures by the Western Allies. The 
assumption may be questionable to many military strategists, but 
I maintain it for model tractability. 
Third and finally, the essay shows the results from the 
following counterfactual experiment performed in Section 4. The 
2 
A 1985 Yomiuri-Gallup poll showed that 59 percent of 
Americans believe that the U.S. must help Japan if Japan is 
attacked militarily; 46.9 percent of the surveyed Japanese thought 
the- U. S. will^ come to their rescue -(YAomiur i,- i£&5) . 
3 . . . 
Specifically, the rise in insecurity as a consequence of arms 
escalation is ruled out. For example, the Soviet Union may 
increase its arms buildup after a U.S. buildup, but I assume that 
after the arms competition is played out, world security increases 
overall. For an analysis of arms escalation, see Snyder (1970). 
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experiment will evaluate the effect on Japan's real economic 
growth of raising the country's defense budget-GNP ratio to the 
U.S. level of approximately 6.5 percent. The test shows that 
Japan's real output growth would have only been negligibly 
affected. Instead of growing at an average annual real rate of 
9.29 percent between 1961 and 1971, National Income would have 
grown at 8.76 per annum. The reason for the small change is the 
very high level of private saving and domestic private investment 
between 1961 and 1971, and that many other factors besides the 
growth of capital were responsible for the rapid growth of 
Japanese National Income. 
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Section 2: Adjustments to the Japanese Defense Budget 
Table I depicts the Japanese defense budget for 1985. The 
conversion of yen into dollars used the rate of 22 0 yen to the 
dollar. An important component of Japanese defense expenditures 
is the amount spent on supporting U.S. troops stationed in Japan. 
Such support includes the construction, maintenance, and 
improvement of base facilities, the salaries of Japanese workers 
on bases, and the rental fees associated with the U.S. military's 
use of Japanese private land. The Japanese government also 
incurred some costs in the support of U.S. troops that are not 
included in the defense budget. First, there is the economic 
opportunity cost of the use of Japanese government land by U.S. 
military forces. This opportunity cost is listed as .22 68 
billion dollars in the U.S. Defense Department's 1986 Allied 
Contributions to the Common Defense, but there is reason to 
believe that the value of land as assessed by the Japanese 
government is only a fourth of the true market value of the land 
(Iwata, 1988). After correcting for this underassessment, the 
market value of the opportunity cost of the U.S. military's use 
of Japanese government land would approximately equal .90 billion 
dollars. 
Land prices are also probably underestimated in the NATO 
countries, but the underestimation cannot be as severe as in Japan 
where land prices near urban areas rose by an average of more than 
50 percent in the early 1980s. Most U.S. bases in Japan are 
located near major and medium-sized cities. 
Table I 
1985 Japanese Defense Budget 
Exchange rate [220 yen/$] 
(Billions of yen and dollars) 
Dollars Yen 
Personnel; Provisions 6.43 1414 
Equipment Acquisition 3.74 822.1 
Research and Development .23 50.4 
Facilities Improvement .20 44.2 
Maintenance 2.15 472.2 
Base Countermeasures 1.35 296.5 
Others .17 37.7 
Total 14.3 3137.1 
* Numbers may not add-up due to rounding. 
Source: Defense White Paper, 1986 (Boei Hakusho) in 
Japanese. Ministry of Finance Printing Office. 
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Second, there are .1203 billion dollars of unlevied taxes 
and fees. The U.S. military forces in Japan are exempted from 
paying certain national and local government taxes and fees. 
Such exemptions include custom duties and taxes on petroleum 
products. Adding .90 billion and .1203 billion to the 14.3 
billion dollar total depicted in Table I, we get 15.32 billion 
dollars. 
A major discrepancy between the NATO definition of the 
defense budget and that of Japan is the omission of military 
pensions from Japanese defense expenditures. Military pensions 
in Japan in 1985 equaled 8.15 billion dollars. The recipients of 
these military pensions include over two million members of the 
old Imperial Army and Navy and their families. Although it is 
not appropriate for consistency with the NATO budget to include 
the pensions of World War II troops, in concert with our 
underlying objective of providing an upper-bound to Japan's 
defense spending, we add 8.15 billion dollars to the previous 
15.32 billion and get 23.47 billion dollars. 
The NATO budget includes military aid to other nations, 
mostly to developing countries. Such aid includes the gift and 
subsidized sale of weapons, and training expenses for foreign 
troops. It has been the Japanese government's policy since the 
1960s to refrain from exporting weapons, so military aid is 
absent from its defense budget. It has often been suggested, 
however, (Sakamoto, 198 6) that economic aid may substitute for 
military aid since economic aid helps preserve international 
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peace. The logic behind including economic aid is that 
economically unstable foreign governments are more prone to 
influence from Communist nations through insurgent groups, 
guerillas. In 1985, Japanese economic aid to the Third World 
totalled 3.8 billion dollars. Adding 3.8 billion to 23.47 
billion, we get 27.27 billion dollars, which is about 1.9 percent 
of Japan's 1985 Gross National Product. Even when the Japanese 
defense budget is made more consistent with the NATO security-
budget, Japan's defense spending-GNP ratio rises to at most 1.9 
percent. 
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Section 3: A Simple Theory of Defense Burden-sharing 
The previous section showed that an upper-bound estimate 
for the ratio of Japan's defense expenditures to GNP could at 
most be two percent. The two percent figure puts Japan's 
security contribution below those of Italy (2.7%) and Canada 
(2.2%), but above those of the non-NATO European nations, Austria 
(1.3%) and Finland (1.4%). 
It is well known that Article 9 of the 1946 Japanese 
Constitution prohibits Japan from using force as a means of 
settling international disputes, and that in 1976 the Japanese 
Cabinet agreed to limit future defense expenditures to just under 
one percent of the Japanese Gross National Product. Defense 
analysts vary in their opinions of whether one percent is 
"enough" to assure Japan's present and future security. To 
borrow Mochizuki's (1984) terminology, "unarmed neutralists" 
argue that there is no realistic threat from the Soviet Union to 
Japan. Not only do they see further militarization as 
unnecessary, but they also see further military expenditures as 
inimical to Japan's security interests by upsetting and provoking 
the Soviet Union. Unarmed neutralists view arms control and 
disarmament as leading to world peace. At the other extreme, 
defense analysts in^  the Japanese—Gaulrl ls£—Gaap- fear^  the Sovietr 
military threat and doubt America's commitment to Japan. These 
critics argue for the revision of the 194 6 Constitution and the 
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elimination of the one percent ceiling; they see a need for a 
large scale Japanese military buildup. Public opinion, as 
evidenced by numerous opinion polls, seems to fall somewhere 
between the two camps. According to one recent U.S.-Japan poll, 
54 percent of the Japanese population thought that the United 
States would not defend Japan when Japan is attacked. However, 
many Japanese do not view the Self-Defense Force as anything more 
than a natural disaster relief organization (Johnson, 1986). 
There seems to be a spectrum of opinion even within Japan on 
the appropriate level of defense expenditures. The objective of 
this section is to derive some measure of the appropriate level 
of Japan's defense spending by using the theory of Public Goods. 
The assumption that larger defense expenditures reduce 
international tension is maintained throughout. The assumption 
is thus not in agreement with the "unarmed neutralist" position 
mentioned above. 
Public Goods have the characteristic that they are desired by 
all members of an organization. These goods satisfy the common 
interests of the organization members. Public or collective 
goods differ from other kinds of goods in the following two 
respects. First, if the good exists, then everyone who desires 
the good automatically benefits. Non-purchasers of the 
collective good cannot feasibly be prohibited from consuming the 
good (Non-exclusivity). Second, if the good is available to any 
one person in a group, the incremental cost of providing it to 
all other members is zero or negligible (Non-rivalness of 
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consumption). Examples of collective goods are traffic lights, 
public schools, and toll-free roads in towns and villages. 
The collective goods need not be something tangible; it may 
be an abstract concept like a general sense of well-being and 
security. Ever since Adam Smith, defense has been considered an 
international public good among nations that are allied. Allied 
countries have a common interest in their collective security. 
Exclusion of a given country is difficult. If international 
security exists, then any Western Bloc country will be able to 
enjoy the fruits of world peace without any additional 
expenditures. In addition, the incremental cost of providing 
international security to any one country is often negligible. 
If West Germany and Austria are allied, the protection of West 
Germany automatically protects Austria. 
Can the U.S.-Japan security alliance be considered a public 
good? Both Makin and Wong in this volume stress that the 
alliance fails to satisfy the condition of zero marginal cost. 
The authors argue that especially in this Nuclear Age, the 
defense of Japan entails a marginal cost to the U.S. that is 
prohibitively high. With the long-range atomic capability of the 
Soviet Union, the United States risks enormous physical 
destruction of its homeland should it go to war on behalf of 
Japan. 
The opinions of Makin and Wong are no doubt reasonable, but 
the authors place too much emphasis on how America is self-
sacrificing without benefiting from the protection of Japan. It 
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must be remembered that the security of Japan greatly benefits 
the United States as well. The fall of the world's second most 
productive economy to the Soviet Bloc would be highly detrimental 
to U.S. political and economic interests. As Sato mentions in 
this edition, the fate of the strategically crucial Northeast 
Pacific will determine how recklessly the Soviet Union will act 
in Europe and the Middle East. The three theatres of the Middle 
East, Western Europe, and the Northeast Pacific are so 
strategically linked that the attack of one will affect the 
remaining two. Sato says that "to the Soviet Union, the sinking 
of its nuclear missile carrying submarines in the Sea of Ohotsk 
would actually mean U.S. nuclear superiority even though the 
Soviets have been victorious in a land battle in Europe or in the 
Middle East." The U.S. defense of Japan indirectly provides the 
United States with much greater world stability. 
The fortunes of U.S. and Japan are tied to the extent that 
even the U.S. defense of its homeland provides large external 
benefits to Japan. Given that the United States is Japan's 
largest export and foreign investment market, a strong America 
with a high domestic demand gives Japan a reliable large-volume 
trading partner and a secure place to store excess funds. 
The reservations of Makin and Wong notwithstanding, the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance seems to crudely satisfy the zero 
marginal cost requirement of a collective good. 
Assuming that international security is a public good, how 
should the cost of achieving the optimal level of international 
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security be allocated among the Western allies? The Appendix to 
this paper presents a model that is a slight modification of 
Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966). The model shows that the benefits a 
country gets from world security is proportional to the country's 
potential output, defined as the maximum GNP a country can attain 
given the country's natural resources, population, level of 
technology, and human capital. This proportionality condition 
arises when the marginal benefit of defense is made equal to its 
marginal costs. If a nation has great potential to produce goods 
and services, then the nation has more to lose by the disruption 
of its productive capacity. In the extreme case of complete 
defeat in a war, the entire productive capacity of a nation will 
be in the hands of the enemy. The importance of international 
security seems to rise as a country becomes more economically 
productive. 
The theory of public goods predicts, however, that if all 
nations acted in their self-interest, there will be an 
undersupply of total allied defense. The reason for the sub-
optimal supply of security for the Western Alliance is as 
follows. If all nations independently decided on their level of 
defense expenditures, then as in the model in the Appendix, the 
optimal level of defense in each country will be at the point 
where the marginal benefit of defense equals its marginal cost. 
However, the optimal supply of a public good occurs only when the 
sum of the marginal benefits of the good equals its marginal 
cost. Since defense is a collective good, a one unit increase in 
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defense increases the benefits of security for all Western Bloc 
countries, not just to the country undertaking the expenditures. 
For there to be an optimal supply of defense, the effect of the 
defense expenditures of one country on other countries must be 
taken into account. For example, when the United States spends 
for defense, other countries with national goals similar to those 
of the United States automatically benefit. Since the U.S. has 
the world's largest potential output, the optimal level of 
defense expenditures for the U.S. will be very large. These 
large defense expenditures may enable other nations to "free-
ride" on international security. This "free-riding" scenario is 
likely to result in an inadequate provision of total Western Bloc 
defense. 
To help resolve the sub-optimal defense problem, assume that 
it is feasible to tax each country according to the increment to 
GNP the country receives from world security. It is 
straightforward to show that a country with the higher potential 
output should be assessed the higher tax. When countries in an 
alliance are taxed in proportion to their marginal benefits from 
defense, there will be an optimal supply of total allied 
security. Since the taxes will sum up to the marginal cost of 
defense, the optimality condition that the sum of the marginal 
benefits of the public good equals its marginal cost is 
satisfied. 
The above optimal defense burden sharing scheme suggests 
that Japan should spend somewhere between 4.1 and 6.5 percent of 
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its GNP on security-related activities. Four point one and 6.5 
percent are the GNP shares of defense for West Germany and the 
United States. Assuming that Japan's potential output is between 
those of the United States and West Germany, and assuming that 
the U.S. and West Germany are already contributing optimal 
amounts to the Western Alliance, Japan should be spending between 
4.1 and 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense expenditures to make 
the total supply of allied defense sufficient. This does not 
imply that Japan should simply purchase more military hardware. 
Any expenditure that decreases international tension is 
appropriate. Such spending may include overseas economic 
assistance and scholarships for students from developing 
countries. In addition, it is perhaps in Japan's interest to 
spend on defense projects that may spin-off products with present 
or future commercial potential. The development of such "dual-
use" technologies should lower the marginal cost to Japanese 
society of defense spending. Further discussion on the 
relationship between technology and defense expenditures occurs 
in the next two sections. 
Before I go to the next section, let me point out that it 
may be unrealistic to assume that both the United States and West 
Germany are presently contributing optimal amounts to world 
stability. If they are, then the theory of Public Goods suggests 
that there is presently a Western Bloc underprovision of measures 
to achieve international peace. The underprovision comes from 
the lack of contribution from Japan and possibly other allies. 
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It may be the case, however, that the perception of fear of the 
Eastern Bloc is exaggerated in the U.S. and West Germany, 
exaggerating their estimates of the total costs required to 
protect the Western Allies from Eastern Bloc aggression. If the 
"correct" total costs are substantially lower, both the U.S. and 
West Germany can spend smaller proportions of their GNPs on 
defense. Japan may not have to increase its present defense-GNP 
share by much. 
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Section 4: The Effect of Increased Defense Expenditures on 
Japanese Economic Growth between 1961 and 1971 
The last section established a simple relationship between a 
country's potential output and the level of defense expenditures, 
drawing the implication that Japan's benefit from international 
security is consistent with its spending between 4 and 6.5 
percent of its GNP on defense. 
Taking the upper-bound estimate for the sake of 
comparability with the United States, suppose Japan historically 
did spend 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense. What kind of effect 
would this larger defense expenditure have on Japan's past 
economic performance? 
The economic effects of defense expenditures can be 
classified into three broad categories. First, as with any 
government expenditure program, defense will stimulate a 
country's aggregate domestic demand. From the late-1950s to the 
first oil crisis in 1974, Japan was at or near full-employment 
(Kosai, 1986). After 1974, however, domestic private consumption 
and investment fell. It is debatable, however, that increased 
defense spending after 1974 would have increased Japanese GNP, 
since several economists argue that in 1974 Japan's full-
employment level of_oiitpiitgrowth actually- declined from about 8— 
percent per annum to 4 percent per annum (Lincoln, 1987). Some 
causes for the fall in Japan's full-employment output are higher 
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energy and primary commodity prices, lower investment in fixed 
assets, and the narrowing of the technology gap with the West. 
If Japan were near or at full-employment between 1974 and 1988, 
increased defense expenditures would have crowded out domestic 
investment, consumption, and exports, rather than raised domestic 
output. Of course, increased defense expenditures may be 
beneficial to the extent that Japan's external trade surplus will 
shrink. Domestic absorption will rise, leaving less of Japan's 
domestic production to be exported overseas. 
Second, the growth in defense expenditures can affect 
Japanese aggregate supply by crowding out domestic investment in 
the private sector and reducing civilian employment. Larger 
defense spending will raise domestic real interest rates, raising 
the cost of capital, and lowering private investment. This fall 
in investment will make the aggregate capital stock grow at a 
slower rate, and through the aggregate production function, 
decrease the growth of potential output. Jorgenson and Nishimizu 
(1978) estimate that Japan's rapid postwar output growth can be 
largely attributed to Japan's very high growth rate of capital 
input. If the growth in capital were dampened, the growth in 
output will slow. In addition, a rise in the military demand for 
manpower may divert scarce human resources from the civilian to 
the military sector. To the extent that labor is an input in 
production, the fall in civilian employment will slow the growth 
in aggregate output. 
The third economic effect is related to the second. Not 
22 
all defense expenditures are purely for government consumption; 
some spending is for investment. For example, 1.1 percent of 
Japan's 1985 defense budget was directed to research and 
development ( R & D ) . It has often been maintained that defense R 
& D may have large potential civilian spillovers (Saxonhouse, 
1988). For example, in the U.S., the military support of 
airplane development and the production of the cargo transport 
plane Boeing 3 67-80 led to the rapid and relatively inexpensive 
development of the successful commercial jet aircraft, the Boeing 
707. Other notable examples of defense R & D spillovers are the 
General Electric jet engine, supercomputers, and the Teflon 
coating on household utensils. 
It is very difficult to assess the potential economic impact 
of military R & D spillovers. The main problems 
1-.^  in the unavailability of direct measures of R & D 
productivity and the necessity of using imperfect proxy variables 
such as total factor productivity growth (Griliches, 1987). As 
Denison and Chung (1976) and Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) argue, 
Japan's rapid growth in the 1960s and early 1970s owes a large 
amount to the import of technology from the West. There was 
probably little need for Japan to develop its indigenous high 
technology through defense R & D between the early 1960s and the 
early 1970s. In addition to the direct effect of military R & D 
on technological progress, the development of military hardware 
will have an indirect negative effect on the competitiveness of 
an economy by consuming the time and energies of highly skilled 
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engineers and scientists. For example, in the United States, it 
is argued that the "deep pockets" of the defense industries 
raised the cost of attracting technicians, engineers, and 
scientists ~o the non-military sector; this, in turn, raised the 
production costs of commercial goods, making commercial goods 
less price competitive relative to the commercial goods of 
competing countries (Rosenberg, 1987). Japan's competitive 
position in the world economy may have been hampered had Japan 
used its scarce engineers to develop military hardware. 
In several high technology areas, Japan is thought to have 
caught up with the West by 1979 (Oshima, 1987). These areas 
include optical fibers, flexible manufacturing systems, and 
semiconductors. Japan is still considerably behind the United 
States in fields such as supercomputers, rockets, and 
space communications. The development of these fields entails a 
high degree of problem solving and unpredictability, and requires 
an ability to integrate complicated systems (Saxonhouse, 1988). 
A stable and high level of U.S. military procurement for new high 
technology products is said to have encouraged risk-taking in R & 
D by U.S. companies (Rosenberg, 1987). With no guarantee of 
government demand for new products, Japanese companies have 
followed a fairly conservative approach to R & D, emphasizing 
projects with a high degree of commercial feasibility. This 
absence of risk-taking may have slowed Japanese technological 
development since 1979, especially in frontier areas such as 
high-speed supercomputers and new materials. The future 
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prospects for Japanese technological development may not be 
bright, since the United States is increasingly reluctant to 
share its advanced technology. For example, it was widely 
publicized in Japan that a recent superconductor conference in 
Washington was closed to foreign researchers. The Japanese 
themselves now seem to realize that the need to develop 
indigenous technology is great (Yamakage, 1985). The conclusion 
to this paper briefly discusses how Japan should develop its high 
technology through government defense spending on basic R & D . 
This section will mostly address the effect of defense 
expenditures on the aggregate supply or full-employment level of 
output for Japan. The analysis will focus on the period between 
1961 and 1971, the era of Japanese high speed growth. The level 
of Japan's National Product for this period satisfies most 
standard definitions of full-employment. Kosai (1986) states 
that the unemployment rate on average was less than two percent, 
and that any further increase in aggregate demand would have 
• 5 . . . • 
accelerated price increases. A rise in military expenditures 
would have crowded out private investment and lowered civilian 
employment. The remainder of this section will estimate the 
effect on National Output of the transfer of labor and capital 
from the private to the military sector. 
There are three reasons for focusing on the "high-growth" 
period from 1961 to 1971. First during this time span, Japan 
The exception is 1965; there was a slight recession after the 
1964 Tokyo Olympics. 
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witnessed a rapid increase in its capital stock. At the end of 
1960, Japan's net fixed capital stock was 14,353 billion in terms 
of 1965 yen. By the end of 1971, this stock had grown to 46,880 
billion — a real growth of 327 percent. This large increase in 
capital no doubt served as a foundation for Japan's sustained 
progress growth during the 1970s and 1980s, despite adverse 
shocks from abroad. 
Second, Wong in this volume has already performed a careful 
study of the relationship between defense spending and GNP growth 
from 1970 to 1985. 
The third reason for focusing on the 1961 to 1971 period is 
that there already exists an exhaustive growth accounting model 
of the causes for Japan's high speed growth from the early 1960s 
to the early 1970s. Denison and Chung's (1976) impressive work 
greatly simplifies my task, since a new growth accounting model 
will not be required. To the best of my knowledge, there has yet 
to be a growth accounting study that treats the period from 1972 
to the present. 
Table II reproduces Denison and Chung's Table 4-6 showing 
the sources for the growth rate of Japanese National Income. 
Japan's growth of real National Income between 19 61 to 1971 
averaged 9.29 percent per annum. According to Denison and Chung, 
of this 9.29 percent growth, growth in the capital stock 
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Table II 
Sources of Growth for the Growth Rate 
of National Income (in percent) 
[1961-1971] 
National Income Growth 9.29 
Labor 1.78 
Employment 1.09 
Hours of Work 0.11 





Nonresidential Structures 1.44 
and Equipments 
Dwellings 0.27 
Advances in Knowledge 2.43 
Improved Resource Allocation 0.82 
Economics of Scale 1.96 
Source: Denison and Chung (1976), Table 4-6. 
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accounted for 2.57 percent, advances in knowledge 2.4 3 percent, 
economies of scale 1.96 percent, increases in the supply of labor 
1.78 percent, and the improved allocation of resources .82 
percent. The growth in the capital stock is the most significant 
factor. 
Under the definition of Denison and Chung, "capital" 
includes inventories, nonresidential structures and equipments, 
and dwellings of the private sector. The government sector is 
assumed to make no factor payments to capital. Hence, the 
contribution of the government sector to National Income is 
solely through factor payments to labor. Between 1961 and 1971, 
private sector capital grew by 11.8 percent. 
The following assumptions are made in the calculation of the 
negative effect of defense expenditures on National Income. 
1) Government defense spending crowds out investment in non-
residential structures and equipment one-for-one. 
2) The expansion of the military sector increases the proportion 
of the Japanese population engaged in the military to .88 percent 
from the customary .20 percent. 
3) Military employment does not result in an increase in real 
output. 
4) The capital and civilian labor shares in National Income are 
constant. 
5) Technological progress is disembodied from new capital 
inputs. 
Assumption (1) is reasonable at or near full-employment. 
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Assumption (2) implies that Japan will have the same proportion 
of its population in the military as does the U.S. when Japan has 
the same defense-GNP share. This assumption is tenuous, however, 
since the two countries may desire a different mix of military 
hardware and human resources. If Japan defines its main security 
objective as the defense of its Sea Lanes and its straits and to 
cope with Soviet contingency in Hokkaido and Tohoku, Japan's 
manpower requirements will probably differ from those of the 
U.S.; the U.S. will define its security objectives in more global 
terms. In addition, Japan may choose to pursue its international 
security by sending economic aid to politically and economically 
unstable countries, and this strategy will surely require less 
manpower than maintaining a standing army. Despite these 
complications, for the sake of argument, let us assume that Japan 
had maintained an active military force that was .88 percent of 
its population throughout the 1960s. 
As in Section 2, assumption (3) implies that military 
employment has no direct positive effect on real National Income. 
The reallocation of civilian employment to defense employment 
lowers real National Income by the amount of factor payments 
previously made to the reallocated civilians. Wage payments to 
military employees results in pure inflation, since military 
employees are assumed not to produce real output. That is, the 
wage bill of servicemen is satisfied by printing money. 
Assumptions (4) and (5) are implicit in the constant-
returns-to-scale growth accounting exercise. Assumption (5) is 
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of course unrealistic. Japanese technological progress proceeded 
by the rapid introduction of the latest vintage of capital 
equipment (Uno, 1987, p.65). For example, the Japanese steel 
industry became highly efficient by the incorporation of oxygen-
processing and large scale open-hearth furnaces. In practice, 
technical change and capital investment seem inseperable, but the 
growth accounting literature has maintained the disembodiment 
hypothesis to make the calculations tractable. 
I first estimate the effect of defense spending on the 
crowding-out of plant and equipment investment. Denison and 
Chung's Table 4-6 shows that structure and equipment investment 
contributed 1.44 points to the 9.29 percent growth in National 
Income. Division of .0144 by .11, the average growth rate of 
fixed net non-residential investment, gives .131 as the constant 
capital share, or the percentage National Income will grow when 
capital input grows by a certain percentage. 
The hypothetical levels of annual defense expenditures that 
are 6.5 percent of GNP are derived by multiplying Japan's annual 
GNP between 1961 and 1971 by 6.5 percent. From these annual 
defense levels, Japan's actual defense expenditures are 
subtracted. A post-crowding out net investment time series is 
derived by subtracting from Denison and Chung's net investment 
data (Table 1-2), Japan's hypothetical defense spending levels 
calculated above. Instead of growing at 11 percent between 19 61 
and 1971, net fixed non-residential capital would have increased 
at an annual rate of only 7 percent. 
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Subtracting 7 percent from the actual growth rate of capital 
of 11 percent, we get 4 percent. The fall in plant and equipment 
investment due to the increased government defense spending does 
not seem to be high, especially relative to the very high level 
of real net capital investment undertaken between 1961 and 1971. 
Net private investment during this period averaged 15.7 percent 
of National Income. 
The multiplication of the 4 percent fall in net investment 
by the capital share of .131 gives .524 percent. The decline in 
plant and capital investment would have decreased the growth in 
National Income by .52 points, from 9.29 percent to 8.77 percent 
per annum. 
The estimation of the effect on National Income of a fall in 
civilian employment entails further assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that the decline in the contribution of labor arises 
entirely from the decline in total private employment. This is 
probably unrealistic, since the military sector would not have 
drawn employees evenly from the various age, sex, and education 
groups. The burden of military service probably would have 
fallen disproportionately on prime-age (20-34) males. Since 
prime-age males work longer hours and are more productive than 
females and older workers, we would expect that two other 
components of "Labor," "Hours of Work" and "Age-Sex Composition" 
would both have contributed less to the growth in output. Given 
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that highly educated workers are more prone to finding ways of 
avoiding military service, however, the average level of 
education in the civilian sector should have grown at the same 
rate as before. It proved intractable to calculate the changes 
in the components of labor other than total employment. 
According to Denison and Chung's Table D-l, total employment 
increased by 6.78 million between 1961 and 1971. The rise in 
total employment, however, was less than the increase in the 
total adult population. The labor force equaled 69.1 percent of 
the population in 1961, but only 65.0 percent in 1971. If the 
rate of participation in the military had remained at a constant 
.88 percent level of the population between 1961 and 1971, there 
would have been a smaller increase in total civilian employment. 
Arithmetic identical to that for the crowding-out of plant and 
equipment investment showed that military employment would have 
lowered the growth of civilian employment by an annual .0075 
percentage points. This fall in the growth rate of the private 
labor force would have decreased the growth of National Income by 
only .0063 points. 
Because of the fall in the growth rates of both capital and 
labor, the growth of National Income between 1961 and 1971 would 
have declined from an average annual rate of 9.29 percent to 8.76 
percent. It should be remembered, however, that this calculation 
is based on stringent and somewhat unrealistic assumptions; the 
results are only suggestive. 
In a footnote, Patrick and Rosovsky (1976) state that under 
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the assumption that all defense expenditures would be at the 
expense of investment, the annual growth of output would have 
fallen by two percentage points between 1954 and 1974. Since 
their assumption of one-for-one crowding out of investment is 
similar to mine, it is surprising that they find such a large 
effect. Although they do not explain their calculation 
procedure, it is probably the case that their growth accounting 
model ascribes more importance to the growth of the private 
capital stock than the model of Denison and Chung. 
This section has so far showed that the increase in military 
expenditures during the 1960s would have decreased the growth in 
physical capital and civilian employment by only an insignificant 
amount. Two other factors that Denison and Chung find important 
for aggregate economic growth are the advances in knowledge (1.97 
of 8.77), and economies of scale (1.94 of 8.77). The former 
refers to the improvements in the techniques of production, 
distribution, and management adopted during a given period; the 
latter refers to the growth of the national market that business 
serves, which allows for greater specialization in production and 
marketing. It is hard to imagine that increased defense 
expenditures would have affected these two factors significantly 
during the 1960s. As Denison and Chung argue, most of Japan's 
advances in knowledge during this period were due to the 
"catching-up" with the "best practice" performed in the United 
States. It is possible, however, that there could have been some 
improvements in the techniques of production in industries such 
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as aerospace and high grade steel. These are sectors that Japan 
has traditionally been weak. Also, it seems probable that 
defense production would have increased scale economies in 
industrial production. The production of defense hardware such 
as tanks, destroyers, and aircraft carriers requires a very large 
plant capacity. 
Before the end of this section, let me briefly discuss the 
plausible effect of the increased employment of engineers in the 
military sector on economic growth in the civilian sector. 
Relative to its population, Japan has a large number of 
engineers. According to Dore (1986), Japan in 1979 had 311 
students in university level engineering programs for every 
100,000 of the population. Great Britain had 47 per 100,000 in 
that year. As for the number of practicing full-time researchers 
in 1985, Japan had 410 per 100,000, the U.S. had 360 per 100,000 
(Science and Technology Agency, 1988). Given that expenditures 
for Research and Development Programs in the Japanese defense 
budget has traditionally been only about one percent compared to 
9.8 percent for the United States, past Japanese demand for 
engineers for military research could not have been high. The 
relatively low military demand combined with the large potential 
supply of engineers in Japan suggests that in the past, the 
salaries of engineers have not been bid up by military R & D . 
The rise in the demand for engineers in the military sector 
between 1961 and 1971 would have increased wages in the civilian 
sector, but the increase would not have been so large as to have 
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made Japanese firms non-competitive in civilian manufacturing 
industries such as cars, textiles, and shipbuilding. Compared to 
other countries, Japan should have had a large supply of 
engineers relative to the supply of other workers. 
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Section 5: Conclusions and Suggestions 
American demands for greater Japanese defense contributions 
remain powerful. Especially in Congress, there is a strong sense 
that the U.S. can no longer pursue domestic economic growth and 
also be the world's policeman. Both the House and the Senate 
recently passed a resolution calling on Japan to spend 3 percent 
of its Gross National Product on defense. There is also a 
proposal pending that requires allies to pay a duty on all 
products that they export to the U.S. equivalent to the 
proportion of GNP the U.S. spends on defense minus the share the 
allies spend on security (Japan Economic Institute, 1988). If 
this proposal is adopted, Japan will have to pay an additional 
tariff of 5.5 percent (6.5 - 1.0) on all exports to the United 
States. 
This paper has argued that for Japan to spend between 4 and 
6.5 percent of its GNP on defense is not inconsistent with the 
benefits Japan receives from world security. It should be 
emphasized that these GNP proportions are not necessarily "moral" 
or "fair." To arrive at some "fair" level of defense 
contributions, we must specify how incomes are to be 
distributed among nations. Such specifications can only be 
arbitrary.  
Also arbitrary is the notion that an ally's contribution to 
world security can be expressed only in monetary terms (Singer, 
1970). That Japan's political institutions are in general 
supportive of capitalism aids the U.S. in its pursuit of foreign 
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U.S. pressure for increased Japanese defense commitments 
will continue. Given that the United States absorbs about 3 5 
percent of Japan's exports, U.S. threats of quotas and tariffs 
against Japanese products must be taken seriously. Assuming that 
Japan has to increase its security contributions, how should 
these new expenditures be allocated among different projects? 
It is well-known that a massive Japanese acquisition of 
conventional or nuclear weapons would have enormous drawbacks. 
If Japan were to re-arm, Japan's Asian neighbors would be at 
considerable unease (Johnson, 1986). The Japanese Constitution 
prohibits a full-scale conventional re-militarization, and what 
is more important, the Japanese population seems to be vehemently 
opposed to a large-scale military buildup. According to a recent 
poll by the Prime Minister's Office, only 7.8 percent of the 
population were supportive of a strengthening of the military 
(Asahi, 1988). 
To the extent that foreign aid improves a developing 
country's political stability, Japan may be able to pursue 
international peace through its overseas economic assistance 
program. For example, foreign aid may serve to mitigate low 
intensity conflicts occuring in El Salvador, the Philippines, 
Cambodia, and Lebanon. In 1986, Japan gave over 6 billion 
dollars in foreign aid, second only to the United States. The 
Japanese government announced in 1985 that it intended to spend 
policy. The productive Japanese economy in itself is a last resort 
provider of military hardware to the United States. 
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over 40 billion dollars in aid between 1986 and 1992. In 1987, 
the time-frame for spending the 6 billion was shortened to 1990. 
There is some concern that much of Japan's present foreign aid is 
de facto tied; that is, the nation often mixes foreign aid with 
export credits to win commercial contracts in developing 
countries (Japan Economic Institute, 1987). If Japan were to 
spend 3 percent of its GNP on development assistance, the country 
would be disbursing approximately 55 billion dollars in fiscal 
1988. If a large portion of this aid were "tied," the increased 
government budget deficits should be more palatable to the 
Japanese voting public; Japanese exports to developing countries 
will rise and there will be some offsetting positive aggregate 
demand effect on GNP. That aid is tied does not imply that 
economic benefits for the receiving country are reduced. The 
developing country may gain substantially if the aid is used to 
hire Japanese construction companies to build industrial plants 
and infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems. Of 
course, the possibility that development aid will be used to 
purchase Japanese consumer products exists. Such an outcome will 
be detrimental to long-term development goals. 
Another area of "defense spending" that may appeal to the 
Japanese public is government support for basic research. Basic 
research has the property that the fruits from the research has 
wide applicability. A subset of the products that are ultimately 
derived from the research effort may be applicable for advanced 
weapons design. For example, improvement in high speed numerical 
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computing may have important uses in tactical missile guidance 
systems. 
Relative to its strength in applied research, Japan is weak 
in basic research. A counting of citations in 
international scientific journals has revealed that Japan is 
fifth in the world in physics, fifth in chemistry, and third in 
the biological sciences. This weakness seems to be a result of 
the low level of government support. While the U.S. government 
finances about half of the total U.S. R & D 
expenditures, the Japanese government supports only about 2 0 
percent. 
Basic research will have a large economic rate of 
return in both countries. Griliches (1987) cites econometric 
results showing that all R & D spending increases the annual 
growth rate of U.S. corporate output by 33 to 62 percent, 
depending on the year. Basic R & D spending, in addition, has a 
premium over general R & D spending by several hundred percent. 
The impact of R & D spending on corporate output in Japan is 
similarly large. Suzuki and Miyagawa (198 6) show for 
manufacturing firms that all R & D spending raises the growth 
rate of output by 4 0 to 55 percent. They do not have figures for 
the returns to basic research, but it can probably be assumed 
that over the long run the premium of basic research over general 
research is as high in Japan as in the United States. 
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Griliches, however, does show that basic research undertaken 
by the private sector has a larger return than basic research 
supported by the government. This is because defense related 
research has typically been characterized by inefficient 
featherbedding and cost-plus-profit procurement (Tow, 1983). 
Defense related basic research also has little regard for 
minimizing costs. High performance testing and laboratory 
equipment are bought with almost no cost-benefit considerations 
(Rosenberg, 1987). Still it is probably more efficient for the 
government to sponsor research rather than to spend on the 
salaries of enlisted men. Sponsored research at least leads to 
some increment in future GNP, but wages are a pure government 
consumption item. Recall that in the 1985 Japanese defense 
budget, salaries and wages comprised 45 percent of the total. 
Given that a large-scale increase in Japanese government 
sponsored basic research is probably acceptable to the Japanese 
public, the country should try to convince the United States that 
it is appropriate to classify expenditures on basic research as 
defense spending. To facilitate this aim, Japan should 
administer its government sponsored R & D projects through the 
Defense Agency, as DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency) does in the U.S. From at least an accounting standpoint, 
Japanese defense spending will then rise. Because of the nature 
of basic research, the results from the research will have 
applications in the commercial as well as in the defense sectors. 
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Tokyo should be liberal with the transfer of basic technology to 
the United States. The 1983 U.S.-Japan technology cooperation 
agreement has been plagued with concerns on both sides that the 
technology "give-away" will be spun-off to commercial 
applications (Tow, 1983). The Japanese worries of transferring 
technology to U.S. companies are real, but the risk of 
transferring commercially viable technology should be viewed as 




This Appendix will show that the benefits a nation gets from 
world security is proportional to the country's potential output. 
Assume that international security is a strictly increasing 
function of allied common defense expenditures represented by 
vector D= (D(l), D(2) , . .., D(i),...,D(N)), i, an index of 
countries. Define country i's actual Gross National Product as 
international security times potential output, Y, minus defense 
expenditures, GNP(i)= F(D)Y(i)-cD(i), where c is the constant 
unit cost of defense, c should be interpreted as the financial 
wealth and human capital diverted from the productive sector of 
the economy to the military sector to create a unit of defense. 
The diversion of resources from the productive sector results in 
a fall in actual GNP. cD(i) will be positively related to the 
amount a nation spends on defense as reported in the official 
government budget statistics. The model above assumes full-
employment; if the economy is not fully-employed, then defense 
spending will have the usual stimulative effects. Potential 
output is the maximum GNP a country can attain given the 
country's natural resources, population, level of technology, and 
human capital. The assumption is that as international tension 
rises, a country will have greater difficulty in achieving its 
economic potential. An increase in country i defense spending, 
an increase in world security, makes a country better able to 
reach its full-employment output. Assuming that other allies do 
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not react to a change in country i's defense spending (the Nash 
assumption), the GNP of country i will be maximized when the 
marginal benefit of defense, F'(D)Y equals its marginal cost, c. 
Let this level of optimum defense expenditures be cD*(i). 
A straightforward application of the envelope theorem 
demonstrates that d[(cD*(i))/GNP]/dY(i)= 
F(D(1),...,D*(i),...D(N)) is positive. As a country's potential 
output rises, it would desire a higher level of defense. 
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